Abstract Dag Prawitz has argued [12] that it is possible intuitionistically to prove the validity of ' A → there is a proof of A ' by induction over formula complexity, provided we observe an object language/meta-language distinction. In the present paper I mainly argue that if the object language with its axioms and rules can be represented as a formal system, then the proof fails. I also argue that if this restriction is lifted, at each level of the language hierarchy, then the proof can go through, but at the expense of virtually reducing the concept of a proof to that of truth in a non-constructive sense.
Background
A couple of years ago [9] I argued against Dag Prawitz and Michael Dummett that the principle of bivalence, i.e. the principle that every sentence is either true or false, cannot have both a metaphysical and a meaning-theoretical significance. This double significance view is a conjunction of two claims. The first claim is that acceptance of bivalence for a particular area of discourse is the principal mark of a realist view of that area. Correspondingly, rejection of bivalence is the principal mark of an anti-realist view. Even though there are other ingredients in realism and anti-realism, and even though there are shades of realism and anti-realism, the stand on bivalence is the main dividing line.
1
The bivalence criterion was not meant to introduce a new idea distinct from traditional metaphysics, but as a way of articulating traditional metaphysical ideas in a clearer and more precise way.
2 The realist idea to be captured by the bivalence that describes it is true, and it fails to obtain if s is false. It will also fail to obtain if s is neither true nor false, but I shall not here take account of that option. Therefore, every state of affairs in D either obtains or does not obtain just in case every sentence in the corresponding discourse area A D is either true or false. Hence, the following general equivalence of bivalent reality:
The realism issue for a domain D will not arise if we know that for any sentence s in A D it is either the case that we can know that s is true or the case that we can know that s is false. For, if we know that, then we do know that D is not mind-independent. An example might be, for each person, the domain of present sensations, reflected in sentences like 'I am in pain'. Disputed domains are those where we lack any such guarantee. For such disputed domains we have two alternatives. Either we can hold on to bivalence, in which case we will also hold that domain to be mind-independent, for then every sentence of that area of discourse is true or is false regardless of whether we can know it or not. This is realism. Or we can reject mind-independence for the domain, and as a consequence we will then have to reject bivalence, for if a sentence is true just in case knowably true, and false just in case it is knowably false, and there is no guarantee that it be either knowably true or knowably false, then there is no guarantee that it is either true or false. So the issue of determinacy is closely connected with that of mind dependence. Let's say that (KA) An area of discourse A D is knowable iff it holds of every sentence s in A D that if s is true, then it can be known that s is true.
I shall here take falsity to be equivalent with truth of negation, so we don't need a separate clause about knowability of falsity. We can now define mindindependence:
For disputed domains, determinacy implies mind-independence, and acceptance of bivalence for the corresponding area of discourse amounts to affirming both. We can sum up the first conjunct of the double significance view as (B1) A disputed domain D is metaphysically real iff A D is bivalent.
The second conjunct in the double significance view is the claim that there are meaning-theoretical reasons for rejecting bivalence. One can put it by saying
